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Abstract
This review provides an overview of the current state of the field of anonymity
research with particular reference to the formal specification of anonymity as a
security property.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In order to avoid discrimination against, or abuse of, users of communicating
systems it may sometimes be necessary to prevent their activities from being made
public. In many cases this may be achieved by robust encryption protocols for
transactions, however in a number of important cases it is necessary for the content
of transactions to be publicly available.
In other situations the very use of a particular system may be incriminating.
Certain websites may be censored, or simply viewed unfavourably by parties with
access to web browsing logs. The use of peer-to-peer file sharing networks, while
legal in itself, can cause suspicion due to the high volume of illegal content. In
these situations, the legitimate user may well desire privacy to prevent the assump-
tion of guilt that others may associate with these uses.
Alternatively, a user may simply not wish their participation in an online sys-
tem to be noted or traceable. Online discussion mailing lists and newsgroups
are frequently archived in publicly accessible locations. The senders of spam
email are known to harvest these locations for email addresses to populate spam
databases. Users taking part in such lists may wish to avoid having their partici-
pation logged to avoid an increase of unsolicited email to their accounts.
In all of these cases, a useful and effective method for protection of the user
is to sever the link between a user’s identity and their observable behaviour in the
system. In short: to make the user anonymous.
Several methods to achieve this goal have been proposed and, at least par-
tially, implemented. Yet, despite some formal foundations in the literature, there
has been very little rigorous design or verification work in the systems that have
emerged. Indeed, there have been almost no proposed formal specifications of
anonymity properties that are of utility in modelling anything more than academic
or toy systems. As a result of this, nearly every system that has been released has
imperfectly protected the identity of its users.
This review focuses on identity hiding, usually characterized by the linked
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properties of anonymity and pseudonymity, with a view to their formal specifica-
tion and quantification. In addition, attention is given to related security properties
that accompany identity hiding in usable systems, including reputation, privacy
and fairness.
Chapter 2
Background and Terminology
“We’re an information economy. They teach you that in school. What they
don’t tell you is that it’s impossible to move, to live, to operate at any level
without leaving traces, bits, seemingly meaningless fragments of personal
information. Fragments that can be retrieved, amplified...”
– William Gibson, “Johnny Mnemonic” (1981)
We first discuss some terms that provide a foundation on which to build more
formal descriptions. Work in this section draws on many separate papers in the
field, however special mention is due to Pfitzmann and Ko¨hntopp (2000).
2.1 Privacy
“Nec vixit male qui natus moriensque fefellit.”
(Not a bad life is that of one who is born and dies in obscurity)1
– Horace, Epistles, I, 17, 10 (c.20 BCE)
The desire for privacy motivates much of the research into anonymity systems.
Anonymity provides a mechanism by which an individual may render their actions
free from observation, and thus protect the privacy of their actions.
The notion of privacy has been discussed at least as far back as Aristotle (384–
327 BCE), who defined the separate spheres of public life: ‘polic’ (polis, city) and
private life ‘oikoc’ (oikos, home). The importance of these concepts is illustrated
1This quote, often found on the Web attributed to Cicero, is normally seen translated as “Nor
has he spent his life badly who has passed it in privacy.” The translation shown here is our own.
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by the derivation from them of the English words politics and economics. Un-
doubtedly, Aristotle was not the first to elucidate these ideas.
Within Britain, privacy has arguably been part of the law since 1361 with the
adoption of the Justices of the Peace Act under the reign of Edward III. This act
included punishments for “peeping toms” and eavesdroppers, themselves deroga-
tory terms that reflect the already negative view held by society towards those who
invade the privacy of others.
Despite this early recognition of personal privacy, privacy as an independent
right has been explicitly recognized only in the past 150 years. One of the first
extant definitions was made by the United States Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis and lawyer Samuel Warren (Brandeis and Warren, 1890), who exam-
ined the right to privacy as a natural extension of the individual right to liberty.
They stated that “liberty” as a right had initially been enforced with respect to pre-
venting physical assault, but that as newer business models and media coverage
started to have significant effects in society, intrusion into private lives for public
consumption became of concern to many, and the ideal of liberty was necessarily
extended to include unfair intervention into aspects of a person’s life that could be
embarrassing or dangerous if publicized:
“Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has be-
come a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery... The
intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have
rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining
influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude
and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern en-
terprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected
him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere
bodily injury.” (Brandeis and Warren, 1890)
In reference to earlier work by a Michigan Supreme Court Justice (Cooley,
1888), Brandeis and Warren define privacy as “the right to be let alone”. This
concept is still fundamental to almost all definitions of personal privacy.
Real interest in privacy, however, appears to have begun only in the second
half of the twentieth century. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights embodies the right to privacy in its twelfth article:
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference
or attacks.” (United Nations, 1948)
Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR,
1997), a section of the International Bill of Rights adopted to expand on and clar-
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ify the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, reiterates the fundamentality of
privacy as a right to which humans are entitled.
Both the European Union and the United States have measures to protect pri-
vacy (European Union, 1998; United States Department of Commerce, 2004),
however these rights are still emerging and in a state of constant alteration.
In British law, the first explicit electronic privacy legislation was the 1984 Data
Protection Act (HMSO, 1984). This act, superseded by the 1998 Act of the same
name, regulates the uses to which data processed by automatic equipment may be
put. The legislation places strict limitations on individuals who store the personal
data of third parties, requiring that any information is subject to a number of “data
protection principles”. These principles include the right of the subject to inspect
any stored data, and the duty of the holder of the information to provide adequate
technical protection for such data. The holder of the data is also obliged to ensure
that the data is not used for purposes other than those for which the data was
originally collected, unless such a use has been agreed to by the data subject.
The British 1998 Data Protection Act (HMSO, 1998) implements the 1998 Eu-
ropean Union Directive on Data Protection (European Union, 1998). This EU di-
rective, enforced across the EU’s economic sphere, includes the principle that per-
sonal data must not pass to countries outside the European Union that do not also
implement adequate data protection measures as defined by the directive. This has
caused some difficulties with the passage of data to the United States, which re-
lies on corporate self-regulation (United States Department of Commerce, 2004)
rather than legislation to protect privacy, and thus does not meet the requirements
of the EU directive. Various programmes are in place to overcome this barrier
between two of the world’s major economic forces, however the insistence of the
EU on strict controls over such a valuable resource as personal data is pushing the
world at large towards strong data protection policies.
There have been analyses of privacy that do not support its importance in soci-
ety. Most notably, the work of Posner (1981) examines privacy from an economic
basis. This view states that personal information should be kept private only if the
economic value to society of such information is decreased by its becoming pub-
lic knowledge. Posner argues that the only personal value in concealing private
information is in deceiving or manipulating others for personal gain, and thus is
not of economic use to society as a whole. This view proposes corporate privacy
as having value, but asserts that personal privacy is not beneficial to a nation’s
economy and so should not be protected in law.
Posner’s view of privacy has not achieved wide acceptance, and many societies
in the modern world have enacted laws that protect privacy to a greater or lesser
extent. The increasing level of information that is transmitted, and thus may be
stored, by computers is causing a greater public interest in the right to privacy. In
the past, privacy was naturally protected by the difficulty of storing and collating
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personal data. As surveillance and storage become increasingly feasible, it has
become necessary to protect this right in more detailed and effective ways.
The privacy legislation and regulations being enacted in various countries
across the world are a useful step in preventing the widespread storage and dis-
semination of personal information. There are, however, always parties that seek
to bypass these measures, for a variety of reasons. Rather than regulate the stor-
age and transmission of personal information, advocates of anonymity propose to
achieve the same goals by preventing such information ever becoming available.
This position provides the motivation for the research covered in this review.
2.2 Names and Identity
Many of the concepts examined in this review are in some way concerned with the
obfuscation of information that relates to a user’s identity. This information can
take many forms, but the classic example is the name. The name of an individual is
intended to be a unique identifier within some group that allows for that individual
to be distinguished from the other members of that group. The fact that, in the
increasingly large social groups in which we find ourselves, a classical name is
rarely unique does not affect the purpose of distinguishing those around us by
such labels.
When we discuss the anonymity properties of an agent, we are implicitly as-
suming definitions of identity. We assume that a user of a system is a unique
individual who performs actions that can potentially be traced by another individ-
ual. However, there is a dissociation between a user’s representation in a system
and their “real-world” persona. Multiple users can collaborate to form a single
online identity, and a single user may have multiple representations online. The
implications of this are not fully understood, as the simplifying assumption that
a single user is linked to a single representation is almost uniformly made in the
field.
While it is possible to work with definitions of a “name” that rely on our
implicit assumptions concerning identity, it should be remembered that there are
many possible interpretations of what constitutes an identity. In forming a model
of anonymity properties, the strict definition of these properties must play an im-
portant roˆle.
2.3 Anonymity
The English word anonymous is derived from the classical Greek stem ‘onima’
(onyma, name), combined with the prefix a- (a-, the absence or lack of a prop-
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erty). “Anonymity” may therefore be understood as the state of being nameless,
or having an absence of identification.
To extend this definition to more common use within the field, consider
“Anonymity is the state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects”
Pfitzmann and Ko¨hntopp (2000)
This definition succinctly expresses the main purpose of anonymity, although
it leaves questions open concerning what is meant by the term “identifiable”.
Anonymity is the fundamental identity hiding property, providing total re-
moval of identifying information from its subject. Any identifying information
required by users or computers can be added into a data channel within an anony-
mous system. As such, anonymity provides us with the choice to limit identity
hiding as much or as little as desired by explicitly revealing identifying informa-
tion when it is necessary.
Total anonymity is the focal point for research into identity hiding. Addi-
tionally, anonymity systems are uniformly based on a small set of possible ap-
proaches, Chaum’s mix (Chaum, 1981) being the most significant of these. (These
approaches are treated in detail in sections 3 and 4). The most active topic of re-
search into identity hiding is therefore the finer details of the various subtle varia-
tions of these basic ideas.
Despite this focus on anonymous systems, total anonymity is very much a two-
edged sword. For certain forms of application, such as posting to mailing lists or
accessing the world wide web, anonymity can be a highly desirable goal. Other
systems, however, suffer greatly if there is no possibility of tracking identities.
Sometimes identity needs to be tracked over the course of an extended transac-
tion, but not between transactions. For this reason pseudonymous communication,
which provides a certain amount of information associated with an identity, is
required for a number of practical identity hiding systems.
2.3.1 Sender and Recipient Anonymity
We have already defined anonymity as the property of being nameless, given cer-
tain assumptions concerning the meaning of a “name”. However, this nameless-
ness is only of use or interest in a communicating system. Communication re-
quires two participants: a sender and a recipient, where either participant may in
actuality be a group of individuals. To whom does this anonymity apply?
This question divides our definition of anonymity into three. We may ensure
the anonymity of the initiator of some communication, but leave the recipient’s
identity open to the world. Conversely it is possible for a sender to make avail-
able their identity, but to ensure that the recipient of their message remains un-
known. This provides a very different problem to sender anonymity, and is also
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less studied. Finally, it may be desirable for both end-points of communication to
be hidden from observation. Each of these forms of anonymity has its own set of
applications, design problems and potential attacks.
2.3.2 Connection-Based and Message-Based Anonymity
Another important distinction is the form of the communication that takes place
between the sender and the recipient. The majority of data transmission over the
Internet uses the connection-based Transmission Control Protocol (Postel, 1981).
However at a higher level, much of the actual communication that takes place,
especially email, is message-based.
Current literature focuses mainly on message-based anonymity, which is an
easier problem than that of anonymity within connection-based systems. There
are some applications, such as remote terminal sessions, that simply cannot be
performed effectively using a message-based approach. For these systems, it is
necessary to use a connection-based approach.
A number of approaches to connection-based anonymity have been proposed.
By far the most popular of these is “onion routing” (Goldschlag et al., 1996).
The main concern with such systems is the requirement for low-latency connec-
tions and bandwidth restrictions. Message-based systems inherently cause delays,
unacceptable in connection-based systems. This makes it necessary to use other
approaches that avoid these concerns, but which then open up a new set of possible
attacks.
2.3.3 The Anonymity Set
The traditional method of quantifying anonymity is to use the size of the “anonymity
set”: the set of all participants who could have performed an action. This approach
was proposed by Chaum (1981), where it was used to analyse the anonymity pro-
vided by a mix (see section 3). The larger the size of the set of participants that
could have performed an action, the stronger the anonymity provided by the sys-
tem.
This quantification, while certainly of use, is not ideal. The most critical of
the deficiencies of the anonymity set is that it assumes a uniform distribution of
probabilities across the set of participants. This assumption is rather naı¨ve for a
group of heterogeneous users. In response to this, a number of alternative quan-
tification methods have been proposed that seek to deal with both this and other
problems inherent in the anonymity set (Serjantov and Danezis, 2002). These are
discussed in section 6.
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2.3.4 Unlinkability
Pfitzmann and Ko¨hntopp (2000), in reasoning about anonymity systems, propose
a viewpoint defined by a set of subjects sending messages to a set of recipients.
In this setting, the critical concept is an item of interest, defined as the sending or
receiving of a message.
The desirable property of an anonymity system is that items of interest are
unlinkable to any identifier in the system, and no identifier in the system can be
linked to a specific item of interest. This provides a basic definition of anonymity,
however it does not lend itself to quantifying the property.
Bitwise unlinkability expresses the concept of unlinkability in terms of the
cryptographic hiding of messages when they pass through a network node (Danezis,
2003). This hiding makes it impossible for an attacker to link an ingoing message
to an outgoing message by examining the raw data itself. Almost all implemented
anonymity systems use this process in combination with mixing (section 3) to
achieve practical anonymity.
2.4 Pseudonymity
“If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they
do not want to hear.”
– Eric Arthur Blair (writing as George Orwell)2
Closely related to anonymity is the concept of pseudonymity. Pseudonymity,
which stems from the Greek ﬁpseudocﬂ (pseudos, false) again combined with ﬁon-
imaﬂ, refers to the adoption of a false name. This is also commonly known as
an allonym (‘alloc’, allos, other), nom de plume (pen name) or nom de guerre
(name of war), after the traditional pre-computer use of pseudonyms as a method
by which authors could publish politically inconvenient material without the threat
of retaliation.
Pseudonymity, in terms of usable online systems, causes users to be associated
with an identifier that is at least semi-persistent. The purpose of this approach is
generally to allow types of transaction, relying on user history and behaviour, that
are not possible using totally anonymous systems. This is of particular use in
systems that rely on networks of trust between users, and thus cannot rely on a
simple one-use “session identifier” approach.
2from “The Freedom of the Press”, Orwell’s original unpublished preface to Animal Farm, first
published in The Times Literary Supplement, 15 September 1972.
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As mentioned above, pseudonymity can be achieved through the use of an
anonymous infrastructure with suitable user information and history stored within
the explicitly transmitted data. If the communication system on which commu-
nication relies is inherently anonymous then pseudonymity becomes an easier
proposition, as data can be released as chosen by the user without fear of extra
information leakage from the system. Care must be taken that the interaction be-
tween deliberately released data and otherwise harmless data within the system
cannot interact to reveal more than is intended.
Pseudonymity may therefore be seen as a problem that exists at a ‘higher’
level than anonymity. An anonymous channel may have some form of persis-
tent user identification added that is kept secret between the sender and recipient.
Pseudonymity may be viewed less as a primitive construction and more as a com-
bination of other security properties such as secrecy, anonymity and authentica-
tion. There has been relatively little practical research into pseudonymity, perhaps
due to the status of anonymity as a problem yet to be definitively solved.
Pseudonymity is related to the overall topic of censorship resistant systems.
Interesting work into such systems may be found in the Eternity service (An-
derson, 1996), the “Publius” system (Waldman et al., 2000), and the work of
Goldberg (Goldberg, 2000; Goldberg and Wagner, 1998). These systems aim to
provide an online cryptonymous data store that automatically mirrors documents
across the entire network. Such approaches are designed to be resistant against
any measure, whether physical or legal, to remove data from the system once it
has been published.
2.5 Trust and Reputation
Trust and reputation are closely linked properties, particularly within the context
of anonymity systems.
Reputation is a property that allows a user to make an informed decision about
whether or not to trust another user. This ability is important in commerce sys-
tems where users are required to invest real economic interests in other users of a
system. The potential risks of such a system are high, especially in cases where
there are no legal restrictions on the parties involved in a transaction. In these
cases, which are common where the Internet allows commerce between coun-
tries with differing legal systems, reputation may be critical to users and legiti-
mate businesses. As such, in many of the practical applications of anonymity and
pseudonymity, reputation is the key to a usable system.
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2.5.1 eBay
The most famous reputation-based system in common use is the seller rating on
eBay (eBay, 2004). eBay is a popular online auction site that manages the buying
and selling of a large quantity of items all over the world. The site functions
similarly to most auctions, in that buyers bid against each other during a given
time period. At the end of this period, the item is sold to the highest bidder.
When the transaction is completed, both the buyer and the seller are encour-
aged to leave feedback concerning the behaviour of the other party in the trans-
action. This feedback takes the form of a positive, neutral or negative rating and
an 80 character free-text comment for extra details on the transaction. When con-
sidering an item, buyers can first examine the ratings of the potential seller. This
allows a user to make a decision on whether or not the seller is likely to be trust-
worthy and follow through with the transaction. The implicit assumption is that
the higher the number of positive feedback reports a seller has listed, the more
likely they are to be trustworthy.
A seller will endeavour to maintain and protect their reputation in order to
attract more business in the future. As such, the seller will be unlikely to perform
any action that could damage their reputation.
This approach towards trust management in commerce systems has been the
subject of some study, for example in the work of Dellarocas (2001). Even before
the invention of eBay and similar systems, reputation as a method of enforcing
positive behaviour in markets had been well-known, and has received much atten-
tion in that field.
2.5.2 Numerical Reputation
Beyond the use of reputation as a human measure of trust, reputation may also be
treated as a strict numerical property that allows judgements to be made based on
objective measurements. A common use of this appears in peer-to-peer network
systems (Dingledine et al., 2003), which must dynamically decide on the best
routes for information flow. In such systems, reputation is a property based on the
past reliability performance of the network node in question.
This use of reputation can be extended to relate to any property of interacting
systems. Recent work in reputation, such as that by Engelmann and Fischbacher
(2002), has sought to unify the traditional economic and psychological aspects
of reputation with the newer reputation algorithms emerging from the field of
computer science, such as those presented in (Dingledine et al., 2001; Dingledine
and Syverson, 2002b; Dingledine et al., 2003).
In anonymity systems, which often rely on distributed networks of untrusted
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assurance that network nodes will behave as advertised. Similarly, for pseudony-
mous online systems, reputation is of great importance in enforcing “good” be-
haviour between participants.
2.6 Repudiation
Security protocol designers often wish a party to prove a certain fact to another
party in such a way that it cannot later be retracted or denied (“repudiated”). This
allows an agent who negotiates a contract with another party assurance that this
party will honour the contract. Non-repudiation is a commonly desired property
in the field of security.
In anonymity systems, however, it may often be desirable to prove a fact to
another agent at some point, but for this fact to be unusable in creating long-term
profile information. The ability to present a piece of information to an agent, but
for this information to be valid for no longer than the course of that single trans-
action, prevents personal information concerning the agent from being catalogued
for the purposes of future identification.
An important approach towards this form of information exchange is the zero
knowledge proof (Feige et al., 1987). This allows individuals to prove that they
hold a certain piece of information without revealing the information itself. Whilst
this notion is not intrinsically a feature of anonymity systems, it is a closely related
information hiding property that is of great potential use in achieving anonymity
in realistic systems. Zero knowledge proofs are discussed in section 4.4.
Chapter 3
Mixes
This section describes the most studied and implemented anonymity technology:
the mix. The mix underpins almost the entire field of anonymity research. There
are many variations that build on the basic mix, designed to overcome attacks
against the structure and to improve on desired aspects related to performance.
Mix systems were first proposed by Chaum (1981) as an anonymizing process
for electronic mail.
3.1 Basic properties
A mix node accepts incoming messages, often emails, which are encrypted with
that node’s public key. The mix decrypts the message and removes all sender
information from the headers. This provides unlinkability, defeating recipient
analysis by removing identifying information. When some specific condition is
reached, the mix forwards a mixed batch of message on to the respective recip-
ients, or to other mixes that repeat the strategy. Mixing defeats traffic analysis,
by removing timing information. The condition that determines the sending of a
message has the potential to greatly affect the strength of the anonymity provided
by the mix and the attacks that can be performed against the users.
Latency is inherent in a mix system. This latency, often an hour or greater for
a message travelling through a network of mix nodes, makes the system unusable
by applications that rely on swift message passing. As such, mixes are typically
used for message-based applications such as email or Usenet posting.
3.1.1 Unlinkability
Mixes accept cryptographically secure messages, which are decrypted and for-
warded to the receiver. This prevents an attacker from observing any similarity
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between the ingoing message and outgoing message.
The message sequence from a sender to a recipient through a mix can be ex-
pressed as (where {M}K refers to the message M encrypted with the key K)
Sender −→ Mix: {Msg, Recipient}KMix
Mix −→ Recipient: Msg
This behaviour can be extended to many mixes by including multiple layers of
encryption, each of which corresponds to a mix in a chain. Messages can therefore
take the form:
{{ ... {Msg, Recipient}KMixn ...}KMix2}KMix1
3.1.2 Mixing
If messages left the mix a known time after they entered, it would be possible to
deduce which messages corresponded to which recipients. So a mix eliminates
correspondence between the time of the message entering the node and the time
at which it leaves. This is achieved in a number of ways, most usually by storing
a number of messages and then flushing them in a batch, with internal reordering
(mixing) of the messages taking place.
The trigger conditions that cause mixes to send out their batches of email
are the subject of much study. Different approaches appear to be vulnerable to
different attacks, and the problem is by no means trivial. In the following section
we review a number of the common mix designs with reference to their flaws
and advantages. A useful overview of this subject is given by Diaz and Preneel
(2004b).
3.2 Pool Mixes
The original mix proposed by Chaum (1981) achieves mixing by accepting mes-
sages that are stored until a certain threshold is reached. The mix then sends out
all stored messages, with the messages reordered from their arrival order.
The technique of storing a number of messages until a given condition is
reached and then flushing messages is the strategy behind a family of mixes known
as pool, or batch, mixes. (Another approach is the “continuous” or “stop-and-go”
mix proposed by Kesdogan et al. (1998), discussed in section 3.3.)
There are two major conditions that trigger the flushing of a set of messages:
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3.2.1 Threshold Mixes
The messages entering the mix are placed into a pool, and when the number of
messages in that pool reaches a certain threshold, the mix flushes the messages.
A mix using this strategy may, however, retain a certain number of messages
at each round. Every message entering the mix therefore has a small probability of
staying in the mix for an arbitrarily long time. This effectively increases the size
of the anonymity set for that mix node to infinity, as the set of messages that could
contain the desired message is all messages that leave the mix after the desired
message entered it. This increases the latency for message delivery.
Threshold mixes are open to an “n−1 attack”, in which the attacker floods the
pool with a set of fake messages that are traceable to the attacker. This allows the
attacker to input all but one message for each round, and thus trace the remaining
message. This attack is discussed in section 3.5.
3.2.2 Timed Mixes
The messages in the pool are flushed at a given time interval (Serjantov and New-
man, 2003). This prevents the possibility of a message remaining in the mix
indefinitely, and overcomes problems that arise if too few messages are processed
by the mix to reach a number related threshold. This guarantees a lower bound on
the latency. However, if only a small number of messages, or even an individual
message, have entered the mix in a given time period then the anonymity set for
the messages is severely compromised.
Most implemented systems that use a pool mix combine a timing and a thresh-
old constraint in order to reap the benefits of both strategies. A notable example
is the MixMaster anonymous remailer network (Mo¨ller et al., 2003), discussed in
section 5.3.
3.3 Continuous Mixes
Kesdogan et al. (1998) present the concept of a stop-and-go, or continuous, mix.
A sender selects a delay from an exponential distribution and adds it to the mes-
sage sent to the mix. The mix delays the message for the given time period before
forwarding it.
This approach allows a great amount of flexibility in the latency of messages.
The user can balance the strength of the provided anonymity against the latency.
This gives the continuous mix potential use in applications that require tighter time
constraints than is possible to achieve with other forms of mix. In addition, a user
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has a predictable latency for messages and so can potentially detect interference
in the network from an attacker who is delaying messages.
3.4 Mix Networks and Mix Cascades
It is not desirable to rely on a single mix node for anonymity. The possibility
of traffic analysis is much higher for a single location on the network (Pfitzmann
and Waidner, 1985). In addition, a lone mix node is a single point of failure.
The possibility of the mix being compromised, by an attacker or a dishonest mix
operator, is too high to risk the total loss of anonymity that these situations would
cause.
So messages are usually routed through several mixes. This ensures the anonymity
of a message, provided that at least one mix on the route is uncompromised.
The routing strategy for a message through such networks is important. Mix
networks (Rennhard and Plattner, 2003) use a free-route strategy, and mix cas-
cades (Dingledine and Syverson, 2002b) restrict the path a message may take
through the network. There is debate as to which strategy is more effective and
robust; Berthold et al. (2000) argue the case for using a mix-cascade over the
more common mix-network. The relative advantages and disadvantages of both
approaches are discussed here.
3.4.1 Mix Networks
Mix networks use a free-route approach to the network path. The user chooses a
path from the available mixes for each message sent.
This provides flexibility. A user may choose to route their message through
mix networks that they trust, or that have behaved reliably in the past. Free-
route networks scale well as the number of network nodes increase. The free-
route approach also provides fault-tolerance, as nodes that cease to function can
be routed around by the system.
The free-route approach does, however, suffer from a number of potential ac-
tive and passive attacks that can compromise anonymity. These are described in
detail by Berthold et al. (2000). These attacks are possible for an attacker who
controls the majority of mixes in a network.
It is possible for an attacker to partition messages going through an hon-
est node based on the number of other nodes through which they have already
passed, this information being available to a global attacker observing network
traffic through compromised nodes. With successive rounds, this partitioning can
reduce the anonymity set for a message to only those messages that have passed
along the same route.
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Danezis (2003) notes that in a free-route mix network with a large percentage
of compromised nodes, the chances of a choosing an entirely compromised path
become high. In such a compromised path, anonymity is completely lost.
Other attacks on free-route networks include the ability to link senders and
receivers across an honest node, and the trickling and blending attacks (discussed
in section 3.5).
3.4.2 Mix Cascades
Mix cascades (Pfitzmann and Waidner, 1985) use a number of fixed paths through
the network. This ensures that more messages take a particular path than with a
mix network, which prevents the partitioning attack.
In a mix network, a node may be a member of a large set of potential routes,
so there may be a big difference between the maximum and minimum observed
traffic. At some times a node may be overwhelmed by the traffic passing through
it, while at other times it may be handling only a tiny amount of traffic. In a mix
cascade, however, all the traffic is routed consistently through nodes in the path.
This helps to ensure that traffic is as uniform as possible, which helps to prevent
an attacker from taking advantage of patterns in message flow.
Mix cascades suffer from a number of problems. In a free-route network, the
attacker must compromise a large number of nodes in order to successfully mount
many of the attacks discussed; in a mix cascade only the nodes on a particular
route need be compromised. This allows an attacker to focus resources. Also, the
flexibility and fault-tolerance seen in free-route networks is to some extent lost
in cascades. Finally, cascades are subject to a simple denial of service attack in
which one node in a route is shut down, effectively destroying a significant portion
of the network.
3.4.3 Hybrid Approaches
Neither of the two extremes offers the ideal solution to routing within a network
of mixes. A combination of the two approaches may be a better solution. For
example, Berthold et al. (2000) enumerate a number of proposed advantages to
free-route networks and show that each can, to some extent, be achieved within a
cascade.
Many of the techniques to improve the behaviour of cascade networks move
away from the strict single-route towards a more flexible routing system. Danezis
(2003) proposes to provide a number of cascade routes through the system, with
the user selecting one of these. Another approach (Berthold et al., 2000) is to
allow each node in a path to nominate a number of potential next steps. The user
can then select from these options.
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One hybrid approach uses a mix network based on a family of sparse, constant
degree graphs known as “expander graphs” (see Danezis (2003) for details). This
network topology, and the use of probabilistic techniques for selecting the next
node in the message path, provide a system that seems to hold many desirable
characteristics of both free-route mix nets and mix cascades.
3.4.4 Synchronous and Asynchronous Batching
Dingledine et al. (2004b) suggest that the perceived difference between mix net-
works and cascades is due to the synchronicity of batching rather than to the net-
work routing. They present an analysis of three network topologies (free-route,
cascade, and a hybrid “stratified” topology) that process messages synchronously.
Every mix forwards messages at the end of a given batch period, and queues any
messages that enter the network during such a period. The details of such a net-
work, where synchronous batching is the defining characteristic of the network,
were first given by Dingledine et al. (2001).
Dingledine et al. (2004b) show that the use of a synchronous batching strat-
egy in free-route networks provides stronger anonymity overall than the other
approaches suggested, and that the traditional problems with free-routes may also
be to some extent avoided. This includes attacks that could previously be resisted
only by mix cascades. The paper does, however, stress that comparison of the rel-
ative anonymity in these networks is open to further research and interpretation.
3.5 Attacks on mix systems
We now review the attacks that are possible against the anonymity provided by a
mix network.
Attacks on anonymity systems seek to weaken the anonymity of participants
in the network, or to render the network unusable so that anonymous messages
cannot pass. The majority of these attacks rely on traffic analysis: the observa-
tion of the flow of messages in an attempt to learn sender or recipient identities
(Back et al., 2001). These attacks may arise purely from passive “packet-sniffing”
approaches, or an attacker may inject their own traffic in an attempt to reveal un-
derlying patterns in the flow of data. Here we provide a high level review of the
more well-known attacks against mix-based systems. A comprehensive survey of
attacks is given in Raymond (2000).
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3.5.1 Passive Attacks
There are two major threat models considered for mix networks. The first, and
weaker, of these is the global passive attacker, who has the ability to observe all
packets on the network, but not to inject, capture, delay or otherwise interfere with
traffic. All attacks possible for this attacker, therefore, rely on observation of the
information about senders and recipients that leaks from the unaltered behaviour
of the network.
The intersection attack (Berthold and Langos, 2002) relies on the fact that user
traffic is not random and can often have predictable behaviour within certain time
periods. For example, consider pairs of users sending emails rapidly back and
forth as a conversation takes place. This behaviour may take place only during
certain time periods (during working hours for a business conversation, perhaps).
By observing this behaviour and performing successive set intersections on the
active users at particular times, it is possible to compromise user anonymity.
Other attacks available to the global passive attacker follow a similar form,
referred to by Raymond (2000) as “contextual attacks”. Any feature that distin-
guishes a particular message from the noise of the background traffic can be used
to infer information about the sender or receiver. Uniformity is the key to defeat-
ing the global passive attacker.
3.5.2 Active Attacks
Far more dangerous than the global passive attacker is the local1 or global active
attacker. This attacker can inject their own messages and packets into the data
stream, to compromise a number of mixes (up to total control of the network,
whereupon the attacker becomes unconditionally able to trace a message), to delay
messages passing through the network, and to alter messages that are already
passing through the network.
A comprehensive overview of active attacks on mixes is given in Serjantov
et al. (2002). Here we review the more common approaches.
The majority of attacks that an active attacker may attempt against a mix are
known as blending attacks. Blending attacks, including the n − 1 attack, allow
a sufficiently powerful attacker to identify the receiver of a message with abso-
lute certainty for basic pool mixes, and probabilistically for some more advanced
mix designs. Blending attacks take the form of trickle attacks or flood attacks
(Serjantov et al., 2002).
Trickle attacks rely on the ability of an attacker to delay or delete messages
approaching a mix. The attacker waits until a mix has flushed its contents then
1The “local” attacker refers to an attacker who does not have total coverage of the network,
however is not necessarily limited to a single machine.
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prevents all, or almost all, messages except the target from entering the mix in the
next round. This attack is less effective with more complex mixes that use dummy
traffic and advanced pool-flushing algorithms.
Flood, or n − 1, attacks also wait until the pool of a mix is emptied. After
allowing a single target message through, the attacker then floods the mix with
enough messages to cause the pool to be flushed. As the attacker can recognize
their own messages, the target message is easily traced.
The n − 1 attack is particularly resistant to attempts to reduce its effect. The
use of complex pool flushing algorithms that retain a number of messages at each
round and dynamically alter timing conditions for flushing only degrade this at-
tack to tracing messages with a certain probability of incorrect identification.
However, the attack relies on a very powerful attacker model, as the n − 1 at-
tack must be performed on all mixes within a network to be fully effective. Thus,
an attacker must be able to flood an entire network with dummy messages whilst
observing the passage of the desired message through the network.
3.5.3 Denial of Service Attacks
Another category of attacks against mix systems or networks does not seek to re-
duce or compromise the anonymity of users, but rather to prevent the functioning
of the mix networks. These denial of service attacks are of great concern in mix
cascades that use known chains of mixes. Destroying the functionality of a single
mix node removes an entire route from the cascade. A determined attacker could
have a serious effect on a network by attacking a small percentage of nodes in the
network.
The precise methods are much the same as for any other denial of service
attack. The focus on messages in mixes lends itself to flooding nodes to the
extent where valid messages cannot pass, however simple computer hacking or
distributed denial of service attacks from worms would achieve much the same
goal.
3.6 Dummy Traffic
In any proposed mix design there may be fewer messages passing through a sys-
tem than required for anonymity, which relies on having as many interactions
occurring in the system as is possible. Low traffic makes most attacks on the
anonymity of users far simpler. Dummy traffic (Berthold and Langos, 2002) can
be inserted into the network to confound traffic analysis.
Dummy traffic is usually generated by the mix systems themselves, although
it is possible for end users to generate their own dummy messages. The more
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dummy messages passing through a network, the better for anonymity. Some
systems pad traffic with dummy messages to cause constant message flow at all
times in the system (Dai, 1996).
Flooding the network to capacity with dummy traffic overlaying genuine mes-
sages is not feasible, however. Many implemented systems, such as (Mo¨ller et al.,
2003), use a lower level of dummy traffic, generated by the mix nodes them-
selves. This traffic is created according to a probability distribution that aims to
mimic real traffic, although the best probability distribution to achieve this is not
known.
There are a number of design decisions when creating dummy traffic. Assum-
ing that the mix itself generates the traffic, it must be decided whether to insert
the dummy messages into the message pool, thus potentially affecting the trigger
condition for flushing the mix, or to add messages to the traffic as it leaves the
mix. There are also choices as to whether the dummy traffic should adapt as the
message flow increases, or remain constant. These issues are discussed in detail
by Diaz and Preneel (2004a), Diaz and Preneel (2004b), and Mo¨ller et al. (2003).
In all cases, the desired behaviour of dummy messages is to be indistinguishable
from the normal traffic in the network. Describing this normal traffic is therefore
a highly important task in the design of mix networks.
3.6.1 RGB Dummy Traffic
A scheme proposed by Danezis and Sassaman (2003) routes dummy traffic through
the network, and delivers it back to the originating node. This allows the original
node to detect attacks on the network by measuring the traffic that is successfully
returned.
The name RGB refers to the types of traffic that are used to detect flooding
attacks. Red traffic is “heartbeat” messages that are regularly sent through the
network with a final destination of the sending mix. Black traffic is the traffic
received by the mix, which may be either valid messages (including the dummy
traffic of another mix) or an attacker’s flooding messages. Green traffic is dummy
traffic inserted by the mix in response to estimates concerning the level of flooding
that the node is experiencing.
This uses the fact that many active attacks, such as the n− 1 attack, use denial
of service to achieve their aims: to control the messages entering or leaving a mix,
it is usually necessary to flood one or more other nodes in the network. In a denial
of service attack, the profile of the dummy traffic changes as packets are dropped.
Although dummy traffic is designed to appear uniform to an outside observer, the
author of the dummy packets can always distinguish them. The RGB approach
takes advantage of this property to provide a warning mechanism for users. In
the case that fewer “heartbeat” messages are returned than expected, a user may
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assume that an n−1 attack is being mounted, and either cease operations or inject
an amount of “green” dummy traffic to improve the anonymity of valid messages.
While this behaviour results in a denial of service for the user, it is preferable to
the loss of anonymity otherwise caused by the n− 1 attack.
Chapter 4
Other Technologies
Despite the focus on mixes within the anonymity community, there are other ap-
proaches that seek to achieve anonymous communication. Many of these ap-
proaches suffer from flaws either in their scalability or in the level of anonymity
that they provide. For this reason most are not the subject of intensive ongoing
research, although most have utility in specific application domains.
4.1 Dining Cryptographer Networks
In 1988, seven years after the mix (Chaum, 1981), Chaum proposed another
scheme for anonymous message sending. The “dining cryptographer” network
provides unconditional sender and recipient untraceability within a network, given
assumptions of cryptographic security between parties Chaum (1988).
Consider three cryptographers dining in a restaurant. At the end of the meal,
they are told that an anonymous party has paid for the evening. They wish to know
whether one of them or an outsider is their mysterious benefactor. They each flip
a coin that is seen by both themselves and their right-hand neighbour. They each
state whether the results of the two coin flips that they have seen are the same or
different. If they are the diner who paid, they lie about the result. Then, if there
is an even number of ‘same’ replies, one of the diners is lying. So the desired
information can be deduced, but without revealing the identity of the buyer.
It is possible to generalize this approach to a reliable broadcast network where
participants share cryptographic keys. The results of the hypothetical “coin flip”
are broadcast one bit at a time into the network. If a participant wishes to make
a message public, they flip the status of their broadcast bit for those bits that
correspond to the high bits of their message. Thus, for each round a “default”
parity of the broadcasted bits corresponds to a “0” bit in some message, and an
inverse parity of all broadcasted bits corresponds to a “1” bit in the message.
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Chaum (1988) proves that, under the assumption of a reliable broadcast chan-
nel and collusion of no more than n− 2 participants in the network, this approach
provides unconditionally secure sender and recipient anonymity.
Dining cryptographer networks are impractical for large-scale systems. The
requirement of a reliable broadcast channel between participants causes the pro-
tocol to be fragile against active attackers who can flip bits and thus potentially
gain information. Some work has been carried out to resolve this problem (Waid-
ner and Pfitzmann, 1990), however there is no entirely satisfactory solution.
In addition to being fragile, the dining cryptographers network is inefficient. A
message is passed at the rate of only one bit per round on the network. In addition,
the protocol relies on a large network of shared keys. Approaches to solving this
problem are presented by Chaum (1988), however the logistics of achieving this
on a large-scale network are far too complex for any widespread implementation
to be considered.
Despite the inefficiencies of dining cryptographer networks, they do provide
an effective method to unlink actions and actors. For small-scale systems, such as
board room voting, an implementation of the dining cryptographer network could
find use.
4.2 Onion Routing
Onion routing aims to overcome the high latency inherent in mix systems. The
design was proposed by Goldschlag et al. (1996) as a method for hiding routing
information in applications that demand almost real-time network connections.
The approach is to wrap a data payload with successive layers of encryption,
corresponding to nodes in a chain of communicating servers, to form an “onion”.
This encryption is performed by the first node of a routing network, which thus
acts as a proxy server for future traffic. Each node along the route “peels off” a
layer of encryption, and forwards the resulting onion the next node in the chain,
as revealed by the decryption process. To defeat analyses of the decreasing size
of the onion, each node pads the outgoing onion up to a constant size.
This differs from a mix system (section 3) in that an onion routing node does
not perform any mixing operations within the node; each onion is immediately
forwarded to the next node.
The network traversal of an onion causes a “virtual circuit” to be set up along
the route taken. Each node stores the forward and reverse nodes in the chain
along with appropriate decryption keys for forthcoming data. The initiator of the
connection encrypts its data with the successive encryption keys of the routers in
the chain and sends the data. Each onion routing node decrypts its own layer and
forwards the data to the next node in the chain. As each node only knows the next
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router in the chain, it is impossible for an attacker to determine the entire path
without compromising either the entire chain or the end-point nodes.
Onion routing is the subject of ongoing research (Syverson et al., 2000; Clay-
ton, 2003; Dingledine et al., 2004a) as a method to achieve relatively strong
anonymity without the latency overheads of mixes. For details on a current im-
plementation of onion routing, see section 5.6.
4.3 Crowds
The crowds system (Reiter and Rubin, 1998) is proposed as a method for pro-
viding anonymous web-browsing capabilities. The system relies on a network
of nodes, referred to as jondos (John Does), that forward web requests for other
participants.
The crowds system re-routes encrypted web requests randomly between users
of the network to obscure the location of the original request. When a user at-
tempts to access a website through the network, the request is forwarded to a
jondo. With a certain probability, each jondo forwards the request to another
jondo, or fetches the website itself and returns the information to the original re-
quester.
The crowds system is vulnerable both to the global passive attacker and to cor-
rupted jondos. A global passive attacker can observe the flow of a message request
and trace the originator, while corrupted jondos can collude or work individually
to increase the likelihood that a given member of the crowd originated a request
(Shmatikov, forthcoming).
Due to the poor anonymity guarantees of the crowds system, which are an
inescapable aspect of the design, crowds has not gained much favour within the
anonymity community. However, it does provide stronger anonymity than ordi-
nary web-browsing and would appear to be scalable, and the weaknesses against
determined attackers have not prevented an implementation of this approach from
becoming more generally popular (see section 5.7).
4.4 Zero Knowledge Proofs
Zero knowledge proofs are an information hiding property with potential use in
many applications that rely on anonymity.
Zero knowledge proofs allow an agent to demonstrate with arbitrarily high
probability that an assertion concerning the agent is valid, without revealing any
more information than the validity of the assertion (Feige et al., 1987). The proofs
typically take the form of a “commitment” stage from the participant who wishes
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to prove their knowledge, followed by a challenge-response initiated by the other
party.
The capability of these proofs to allow assurance without revealing informa-
tion has uses in digital anonymous cash, in authentication without revelation of
identity, and in verification of adherence to protocols by possibly untrustworthy
participants.
The canonical example of a zero knowledge proof is that of Ali Baba’s cave
(Quisquater et al., 1990). Consider a cave containing a hidden door that allows a
person knowing the secret magic words to pass from C to D (see figure 4.1).
A
B
C D
Figure 4.1: Zero knowledge proof: Ali Baba’s cave with a secret door between C
and D
If Alice wishes to convince Bob that she knows the secret to pass between C
and D, she can demonstrate her knowledge, without revealing the secret of the
door to Bob, in the following way.
Initially, Alice and Bob stand together at the entrance of the cave, A. Alice
proceeds to eitherC orD without being observed by Bob. This is the commitment.
On reaching her destination, Alice calls out to Bob, who then proceeds to stand
at B. Bob then calls out a direction from which he wishes Alice to appear. If Alice
knows the secret of the door, she can appear from either direction regardless of
her initial commitment.
At each run of this protocol, Alice has a fifty percent chance of being in the
correct location. If Alice ever appears from the wrong direction, Bob can be con-
fident that she does not know the secret of the door. Each time that Alice appears
from the correct direction, Bob’s confidence in Alice’s knowledge of the secret in-
creases. By performing this test a large number of times, Alice can convince Bob
of her knowledge of the secret to an arbitrarily high level of probability without
ever revealing the secret itself.
Only Bob, or an observer present at the time of the protocol run, can be confi-
dent in the results. Any replaying of the protocol after the event, such as a video
recording of Alice emerging from the correct directions, could be faked.
Chapter 5
Deployed Anonymity Systems
Chaum (1981) sparked serious research into online anonymity. Since then, several
systems have been implemented. The most famous historical anonymity services,
and the leading contemporary approaches, are reviewed in this section.
5.1 Type-0 (anon.penet.fi)
The original, and to this day most popular, anonymous remailer system was a sin-
gle machine, anon.penet.fi, run by Johan Helsingius in Finland. This ma-
chine operated a simple remailing policy whereby a user could send the server an
email containing an extra header specifying the ultimate destination of the mes-
sage. The server stripped all identifying information from the email’s headers,
then forwarded the email to the destination. A simple reply service was also pro-
vided, by which a user could set up a pseudonym on the server, all email to which
would be forwarded to the owner’s real email address.
This system, though naı¨ve, was tremendously popular. However, the system
ran on a single server, which was open to both legal and electronic attacks. The na-
ture of the server also caused the administrator to be in possession of the identities
of all users. This simplicity of use and lack of protection against attacks that are
now considered commonplace has caused anon.penet.fi to be retroactively
labelled as the “Type-0” remailer.
A user of the service began anonymously distributing material from among
the secret teachings of the Church of Scientology, which responded by suing the
user. The legal case caused the logs and data stored on anon.penet.fi to
be subpoenaed. This, in combination with allegations of the distribution of child
pornography through the server, caused its eventual closure in 1996, after three
years of providing anonymous services.
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5.2 Type-I (Cypherpunks)
Members of the online cryptography advocacy mailing list cypherpunks (Cypher-
punks, 2004) developed and deployed the “Type-I” or “Cypherpunks” remailer
network. This network uses multiple servers and PGP encryption for all mes-
sages. By encrypting emails with the keys of a number of servers it is possible
to chain a message through a series of nodes before reaching the final destina-
tion. These design decisions removed the critical flaws that eventually caused the
demise of the original Type-0 remailer.
The Cypherpunks remailer system, still in use today (APA-S, 2004), uses reply
blocks to allow anonymous replies to emails. A reply block is a series of routing
instructions that allow the message to be delivered to a pseudonym. This data
is included in an anonymous message when sent, and so allows the recipient to
reply, despite not knowing the identity of the sender.
5.3 Type-II (MixMaster)
The Type-I network is still open to many attacks on the anonymity of users. In
1994, in an attempt to rectify these problems, Lance Cottrell released the Type-II
“MixMaster” remailer (MixMaster, 2004; Mo¨ller et al., 2003).
Mixmaster improves the anonymity service over the original Type-I remailer.
Firstly it introduces fixed-length messages, with shorter messages being padded
up to the message length and larger messages being broken up into multiple mes-
sages. This defeats the trivial attack of following a message from sender to re-
ceiver through the size of the message. Secondly, it implements a message pool to
increase the difficulty of performing traffic analysis. This makes MixMaster the
first implemented system to approach the design laid out by Chaum (1981).
MixMaster development has continued since 1994, and it is the most popular
remailer network currently in use. MixMaster does not implement reply function-
ality, due to the difficulty of maintaining anonymity with the use of reply blocks,
so the Type-I remailer also continues to be used.
5.4 Type-III (MixMinion)
MixMinion is the latest remailer network, jointly designed by members of the aca-
demic and remailer communities. MixMinion improves on the Type-II remailer
by including a secure reply capability (Danezis et al., 2003).
Many of the features used in Type-II remailers are employed to transport mes-
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sages across the network, with the addition of functionality such as TLS1 encryp-
tion for links between mixes and a frequent rotation of authentication keys for
each mix in order to prevent replay attacks.
MixMinion includes secure reply for anonymous messages. This is achieved
through Single-Use Reply Blocks (SURBS). The message path is split into two
halves (or “legs”), and the first half of the message path is encoded into the SURB,
which accompanies the message. The message then continues along the entire
path. When an anonymous reply is formed, the path encoded in the SURB is used
to determine the second half of the reply path (which thus returns the message
to the original sender), and the first half is formed randomly by the mix. Hence
forward and reply messages are indistinguishable within the network.
MixMinion is still in the early stages of development, however the project is
receiving considerable interest within the remailer community and development
is highly active.
5.5 JAP
JAP (2004) is an anonymizing proxy server developed and hosted at the Technical
University of Dresden, with certain nodes on the network hosted by other Univer-
sities. The JAP software uses a mix cascade approach to provide anonymity, how-
ever the application of the network is geared towards low-latency requirements
such as web browsing.
JAP gained some notoriety in 2003 when the German Federal Bureau of Crim-
inal Investigation successfully ordered the JAP service to record data concerning
connections for future analysis. This ruling was later overturned by the District
Court in Frankfurt (JAP Ruling, 2004), however the damage done to the system’s
reputation and the worries concerning future reversals of the court’s decision have
remained.
5.6 Tor
Tor (“The Onion Router”) (Dingledine et al., 2004a) is an implementation of an
onion routing network designed to allow anonymous access to lower-latency ser-
vices such as web-browsing and remote shell access. This network, along with the
MixMinion effort, is being developed as part of the FreeHaven project to create a
functional data haven (Dingledine et al., 2000).
1The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is the latest incarnation of Netscape’s Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol. TLS is an extension of version 3 of the SSL protocol, and has been
adopted as a web standard. TLS is commonly used in most forms of encrypted Internet traffic.
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Tor presents a scalable implementation of onion routing that uses standard
proxy protocols to forward services across the network. The system is in the early
stages of development, but is already usable for a number of applications. The
combination of the low-latency overheads of the network with the integration of
the system into a standard proxy format may allow Tor to be more widely adopted
than many anonymity services, which have traditionally been weighed down with
complex requirements on the user.
Tor can provide not only anonymity for the user of the system, but also can
obscure the location of services such as web sites offered through the network.
This is achieved through the ability of a server to “extend” a circuit into the net-
work with no fixed client on the other end (see section 4.2 for details of circuits in
onion routing). A client using Tor can connect to this extended service and relay
requests through to the server without knowing the server’s address. This provides
censorship-resistance capabilities.
5.7 Freenet
Freenet (Clarke et al., 2000) is an anonymous document publication and distribu-
tion service that uses encrypted data storage, geographical distribution, and anony-
mous communication between nodes. Anonymity within the network is provided
both to the authors and the readers of documents.
The Freenet network protocol is most similar to the Crowds system (Reiter
and Rubin, 1998), with requests being randomly redirected between nodes before
finally reaching their destination. As such, the anonymity that the system provides
is vulnerable to most of the attacks that mixes and onion routing seek to prevent.
Despite these flaws, Freenet has received a great deal of interest and use.
The project homepage (FreeNet, 2004) claims over two million downloads of the
Freenet software as of the time of writing, and there is a significant user com-
munity hosting content within the Freenet system. The popularity of the system
represents more interest than in any other anonymity-based service currently run-
ning on the Internet.
Chapter 6
Modelling Anonymity
It is common for analytical approaches to describing anonymity systems to use
simple quantifications and basic probabilistic models. There have also been some
approaches to producing formal frameworks for the more general description of
anonymity systems. These approaches, while not in widespread use, provide some
inspiration for methods that could be produced in the future. Here we review some
notable approaches.
6.1 Quantifications
Anonymity is not all or nothing: some anonymity systems are in some sense
stronger than others. Here we review some means to quantify that strength.
6.1.1 The Anonymity Set
The anonymity set has been the basis of the traditional measure of anonymity since
it was proposed by Chaum (1981). The metric is the cardinality of the set S of all
participants who could have initiated an action (usually, the sending or receiving
of a message). Assuming a uniform probability distribution, the probability that
any individual i is the initiator is P (i) = 1/|S|.
This provides a useful first approach to measuring anonymity, but it is not
sufficiently powerful to describe the anonymity of a real system. For a set of users
with non-uniform probabilities of having performed an action, the anonymity set
is a poor metric of anonymity.
“Anonymity is the stronger, the larger the respective anonymity set is and
the more evenly distributed the sending or receiving, respectively, of the
subjects within that set is.” Pfitzmann and Ko¨hntopp (2000)
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6.1.2 Information Theoretic Metrics
In an attempt to overcome the limitations of the anonymity set as a metric, Serjan-
tov and Danezis (2002) and Diaz et al. (2002) independently proposed information
theoretic anonymity metrics.
Information entropy (Shannon, 1948) quantifies the level of uncertainty inher-
ent in a set of data. Shannon entropy, in bits, may be calculated as:
H(S) = −
∑
i∈S
pi log2 pi (6.1)
where pi is the probability of event i from the set of all possible events S.
The information theoretic anonymity metric calculates the entropy in terms
of the anonymity probability distribution over the set of all users. This proba-
bility distribution links each user with a given message through a (possibly zero)
probability of being either the sender or the receiver of that message, as viewed a
posteriori by an attacker.
The information theoretic metric expresses anonymity in terms of the number
of additional bits of information an attacker would need to perfectly identify the
originator of an action. If a particular pi = 1, hence all other pj = 0, then
H(S) = 0, and an attacker needs no further information to uniquely identify i as
the source of the action in question. In the case that all the pi are equally probable,
H(S) = log
2
|S|, and the metric reduces to the simple anonymity set metric.
This approach provides a flexible and robust approach to quantifying anonymity
properties. There is further work to be undertaken concerning the analysis of the
anonymity of chained mix nodes (Serjantov and Danezis, 2002). This metric sug-
gests the possibility of measuring attack efficacy via the entropy reduction caused
by the actions of the attacker, however this capability has not been explored in the
literature.
6.2 CSP and Anonymity
Schneider and Sidiropoulos (1996) examine anonymity as formalized in the CSP
notation (see section 7.3.1).
The model relies on using certain existing features of CSP as an analogy for
aspects of anonymity. “Hiding” CSP events from the view of other processes
is used to model the anonymous sending of a message. Parallel execution of
processes models an anonymity set of processes that could have performed an
action.
The anonymity property is defined to be that the traces of the model (the se-
quences of actions observable to an outsider or attacker) should be identical, re-
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gardless of the original sender of the message. This ensures that an attacker cannot
distinguish a user in the network based on the actions that the users perform.
This CSP anonymity framework is then used to prove the unlinkability be-
tween sender and message in Chaum’s basic three agent dining cryptographer
network (Chaum, 1988). The model is highly specialised for the specific case of
a dining cryptographer network, and has only the broadest applicability to other
anonymity systems.
Adding a probabilistic aspect to the more deterministic views that are tradi-
tional in process calculi appears to be an essential aspect of building a functional
model of real anonymity-providing services. Schneider and Sidiropoulos (1996)
propose this approach, but it does not appear to have been subsequently pursued.
6.3 Group Principals
Syverson and Stubblebine (1999) present an approach towards formally reasoning
about anonymity systems based on epistemic logic (see section 7.2 for a discus-
sion of such logics).
Their approach treats the knowledge and actions of a group of principals,
rather than that of individual agents. This shift from individuals to groups is well-
suited to modelling anonymity systems, which intrinsically rely on the interaction
of groups of agents in order to preserve anonymity. The epistemic logic developed
in the paper relies on the standard S5 axioms for modal logics (see section 7.2),
and also gives an agent a local “clock” that keeps track of the time-order of events
observed by the agent.
The model allows principals to possess knowledge from three sources:
• A log of timestamped actions, from which elements may be deleted
• A set of facts, either deduced from the environment, or predefined
• A set of recent actions performed by the agent
The logic expressed by Syverson and Stubblebine (1999) relies on four group
principals that allow the expression of knowledge possessed by a group of agents.
These principals are:
• Collective Group (⋆G): What is known by combining the knowledge of the
group G of agents.
• And-Group (&G): What is known by every member of group G.
• Or-Group (⊕G): What is know by one or more members of group G.
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• Threshold-Group (n − G): What is collectively known by any given sub-
group of G of cardinality n; this may be considered as a collective group of
or-groups each with cardinality n.
This framework treats actions that are performed within a run of the system,
and are entered into or purged from the log of any agent that observes the action.
A set of axioms based on the group principals listed above allows agents to gain
knowledge from the system as each action is performed. The use of deduction
rules expresses the knowledge that a particular agent may gain, and thus the po-
tential of an attacker to deduce the identity (compromise the anonymity) of an
agent in the system.
6.4 Anonymity in Multiagent Systems
Halpern and O’Neill (2002) present a “runs and systems” framework for analysing
security systems. This is based on an epistemic logic of multiagent systems. Each
agent in a system consists of a local state that contains all knowledge held by that
agent. The state of the system is a tuple of the local states of all agents in the
system.
The basis of the modelling approach is that of the run, a description of the
possible execution states of a system considered over time. Logical deductions
concerning the properties of agents are made based on points, expressed as a pair
(r,m) of a run r at a certain time m. This is analogous to the concept of traces
seen in the process calculus CSP (see section 7.3.1).
Halpern and O’Neill (2004) then apply this framework to the problem of
analysing anonymity properties within multiagent systems. The definitions of
anonymity represents the lack of knowledge that an agent j has to link an agent i
with a particular action a. If j cannot deduce a link between i and a then i can be
said to have anonymity with respect to a.
This definition is extended to two forms: minimal and total anonymity. With
minimal anonymity for a particular action, j is unaware that iwas the originator of
this action, but there are no limitations on how many other agents j believes could
have performed the action. For total anonymity, then for all i 6= j, j believes that
i could have been the source of the action.
This approach includes a probabilistic element to the anonymity property. This
is achieved by defining a probability associated with the knowledge of an agent
at each stage. Thus, runs of the system for each probability are considered with
varying degrees of likelihood. This attempt to address the probabilistic aspects of
an anonymity system are some of the first that have been seen in formal methods
approaches to anonymity.
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6.5 A Modular Approach
Hughes and Shmatikov (2004) model anonymity based on the concept of a func-
tion view. This uses partial information known about some function as a model for
aspects of anonymity. An attacker’s knowledge is modelled through the informa-
tion they hold concerning particular functions. This approach does not consider
any probabilistic elements.
Hughes and Shmatikov (2004) model and quantify anonymity using epistemic
logics and process calculi combined in a modular fashion. (For more on these,
see section 7). Epistemic logic is used to model the system itself, representing
all possible states of a system as a Kripke structure1; observational equivalences
from process calculi are used to express the observable differences between con-
figurations of the system.
The representation of anonymity revolves around the notion of “opaqueness”,
defined as the information that an attacker or observer may gain concerning a
particular function within the framework of the function view. Increasing levels of
opaqueness hide greater amounts of information in the function, which correspond
to greater levels of uncertainty about which aspects of a system are linked.
Hughes and Shmatikov (2004) present a case study using this framework. The
study considers an anonymity property, defined as the secrecy of the identity of
communicating agents, and a privacy property, defined as the secrecy of the rela-
tionships between agents. The proof that these properties hold is highly involved.
This modular framework approach is flexible and presents some interesting
approaches towards the definition of anonymity. The use of both epistemic logic
and process calculi as modules in an overall approach provides insight into the
potential roˆles that they may play in developing other frameworks for modelling
and measuring anonymity.
1A Kripke structure is a commonly used construct in logic. The structure itself is a non-
deterministic finite state machine with all states in the machine possessing boolean labels that
express the evaluation of that state.
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Chapter 7
Formal Methods
“Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only proved it correct, not tried
it.”
— Donald Knuth. From a memo: “Notes on the van Emde Boas
construction of priority deques: An instructive use of recursion”, (1977)
Formal methods provide a rigorous approach to defining required concepts,
and thus the design and evaluation of software. By using mathematical notation
to describe systems, formal methods aim to increase reliability and verifiability in
software from the requirements phase onwards. This section reviews the use of
formal methods approaches in security, with a focus on possible applications for
the design or description of anonymity systems.
The field of formal methods encompasses many approaches for designing dif-
ferent kinds of system. Many of the most well-known formal methods are aimed
at the specification and design of programs, and do not fall within the scope of
this review, which chooses to concentrate on formal methods applied to security
in communication protocols. As such, the reader familiar with formal methods
should not be surprised at the lack of mention afforded to approaches such as B,
Z or VDM below.
7.1 Motivation
The widespread adoption of the Internet, combined with its inherent insecurities,
has led to the creation of numerous protocols with the intention of hiding data from
the eyes of malicious observers. Unfortunately, the creation of such protocols has
proved to be a non-trivial task. Security protocols must be designed with extreme
care to avoid flaws that can result in total compromise of the protected data. These
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flaws may not be immediately obvious, and in some cases have been discovered
after a protocol has been in use for a number of years, such as the attack presented
by Denning and Sacco (1981).
With the development of formal frameworks that treat the interaction of pro-
cesses via communication channels, such as Hoare’s CSP (Hoare, 1985) and Mil-
ner’s π-calculus (Milner, 1999), it has become possible to represent these pro-
tocols formally and thus rigorously reason about their properties. This allows
security protocols to be proved secure against known attacks.
It should be emphasised, however, that despite reference to security “proofs”,
a formal methods approach can never prove the total security of a protocol. Any
proof relies on a model or abstraction of the protocol as implemented, and makes
assumptions that can become potential points of attack. What these proofs provide
is a much higher level of assurance of the correctness of the protocol.
By formally defining anonymity as a kind of security property, it should be
possible to construct proofs of the anonymity provided by systems in a similar
fashion to the approach taken towards proving traditional security properties, such
as authentication or secrecy.
There are a number of different approaches towards proving security proto-
cols. The formal approaches towards security began with the use of formal logics.
The logic approach has been gradually superseded by process calculi approaches,
and their accompanying use of automated tools to prove properties of systems.
These major approaches are reviewed here.
7.2 Logics
Formal (symbolic) logics grew out of a desire to form a mathematical model of
reasoning, which could be used to express the logical relationship between stated
concepts, and to generate new “true” statements by the application of rules to
existing statements. Propositions are proved using these rules, from facts that are
already known and basic axioms that are assumed to be true.
The underlying rules differ between the various formal logics, depending on
the scope and purpose of the logic in question. Different logics express notions of
belief, knowledge, uncertainty, or even ignorance, within specific domains.
The application of formal logics to the analysis of security protocols was
one of the first approaches taken towards the verification of such systems, with
the most notable example being the BAN logic (Burrows, Abadi, and Needham,
1989). Logics have been shown to detect a range of problems with protocols
whilst being reasonably easy to use. However, logics are a high level abstraction
of a system, and may allow flaws that exist in the lower-level protocol implemen-
tation to pass undetected.
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Here, we review the major forms of symbolic logic that relevant to security
proofs. In general, these are based on modal logic (see section 7.2.2).
7.2.1 Some basic notation
In representing statements for logical manipulation, certain basic notation is com-
monly used:
p : The statement of a proposition p
p ∧ q : conjunction: “p and q”. If p and q are both true
then p ∧ q is also true.
p ∨ q : disjunction: “p or q”. If either or both of p and q
are true, then p ∨ q is also true.
¬p : negation: “not p”.
In some logics, ¬¬p is not necessarily provably equal to p.
In some logics, negation is not present.
p→ q : implication: “p implies q”.
This is equivalent to ¬p ∨ q.
p↔ q : equivalence: “p if and only if q”.
This is equivalent to (p→ q) ∧ (q → p).
Modal logics use all the tautologies of propositional logic, and generally also
rely on the rule of “modus ponens”:
If p and p→ q, then q
7.2.2 Modal Logics
Modal logics consider questions of necessity and possibility. The logics of this
family are concerned with qualifiers that concern the state, or modality, of propo-
sitions based on sets of defining axioms. The basic syntactic elements, or “modal-
ities”, are the two statements that represent possibility and necessity:
3p : it is possible that p
2p : it is necessary that p
These may each be expressed in terms of the other, using negation:
• 3p, “it is possible that p” ↔¬2¬p or “it is not necessary that not p”
• 2p, “it is necessary that p”, ↔¬3¬p or “it is not possible that not p”
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There are many forms of modal logic that rely on different sets of axioms. The
most common axiom set is modal logic S5, originally proposed by Lewis (1918):
1. 2(p→ q) → (2p→ 2q)
2. 2p→ p
3. 3p→ 23p
The first of these axioms describes the distribution property of the necessita-
tion operator, that if it is necessary that p implies q then if it is necessary that p it
is also necessary that q. The second axiom simply expresses that if it is necessary
that p then p is true. The third axiom states that if it is possible that p, then it is
necessary that it is possible that p.
These S5 axioms allow a wide range of expressive power, and provide a basis
for more advanced forms of modal logic. Numerous other sets of axioms also
exist.
One semantics for modal logics is given in terms of possible worlds. Proposi-
tions may be true in some worlds but not in others (for example, the proposition
“it is raining”). Necessity can then be modelled as propositions that must be true
in all worlds.
In treating anonymity systems, we are concerned with modalities such as those
expressed above. For systems of agents as observed by an attacker attempting to
compromise anonymity, we are interested in the possibility that any member of a
set of agents could have performed an action. The attacker will seek to reduce this
to the smallest number of possible originators, whilst it is the aim of the system to
prevent this. Modal concepts may prove useful in constructing a useful definition
of anonymity for more advanced models.
Modal logic in its strict sense refers to the two basic statements of possibility
and necessity, but the name is also used to refer to other logics that use different
modalities. We now review those other logics that are relevant for anonymity
models.
7.2.3 Epistemic Logics
Epistemic logics are concerned with propositions of knowledge, uncertainty, and
ignorance. Knowledge, in the sense used by these logics, refers to an agent’s
justified beliefs based on observed facts (as opposed to doxastic logics, which
treat beliefs of an agent based on lesser levels of justification).
Logics of knowledge add operators to express the knowledge held by a partic-
ular agent:
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Ki p : agent i knows (has justified belief in) proposition p
Ki may be considered a necessity operator similar to 2 in the previous section.
We therefore have a corresponding possibility of falsity:
¬Ki¬p : agent i does not know that p is not true.
When we consider that an agent may know a particular proposition, then the
basic axioms that express reasoning about this knowledge may be given, along
with modus ponens, as:
• Ki(p→ q) → (Ki p→ Ki q)
• Ki p→ p
which allow the deduction of facts from knowledge already possessed by the
agent, and for an agent to deduce new facts based on observation. These cor-
respond to the first and second axioms of S5 shown above, with Ki as the neces-
sitation operator.
The capabilities of agents can vary greatly depending on the particular axioms
of the epistemic logic. One important distinction is the quality of introspection,
both positive and negative. This concept refers to the ability of an agent to know
its own level of knowledge. The following axioms give positive and negative
introspection:
• Ki p→ Ki Ki p (Positive Introspection)
• ¬Ki p→ Ki¬Ki p (Negative Introspection)
With positive introspection, an agent i that knows a particular fact p also knows
that it knows p. The second, and much stronger, case of negative introspection
says that an agent is aware of its own ignorance: if i does not know p, then it
knows that it does not know p. With the addition of these two axioms, the given
system of epistemic logic closely resembles the modal logic S5 with Ki in place
of the necessity operator.
Although not expressed in the context of anonymity systems, a comprehensive
work on this approach is Halpern (1997), who considers several epistemic logics
based on combinations of a small set of axioms. The work explores the possibil-
ities and strengths of agents within these logical systems, and the inference rules
that can be derived.
Epistemic logics consider the semantic “possible worlds” that can be con-
structed from the knowledge held within the system. Thus, if an agent knows a
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fact p then it will not consider those worlds in which ¬p is true. In expressing at-
tacker models and the behaviour of agents, the knowledge that can be deduced by
an agent from observed facts is of great importance to the anonymity that the sys-
tem provides: we seek to prevent the revelation of facts that decrease the number
of valid possible worlds.
7.2.4 Temporal Logics
Temporal logics add the dimension of time to propositions within a logic. This
allows logics to express not only the truth of propositions, but also when the truth
characteristic holds. This can add a significant level of complexity to a logic,
however it increases the expressive power considerably. Although temporal logic
covers all those logics that include statements concerning time, it is commonly
used to refer to modal temporal logics similar to the tense logic introduced by
Prior (1957). This approach considers timing as an ordering of events, but does
not place any metric on that order.
There are four basic operators in Prior’s temporal logic, split into two “weak”
tense operators, and two “strong” tense operators:
• Weak
P p : It has at some time been true that p.
F p : It will at some time be true that p.
• Strong
H p : It has always been the case that p.
G p : It will always be the case that p.
Similar to the equivalence possible between necessity and possibility in modal
logic, the weak tense operators may be expressed in terms of the strong tense
operators by use of negation. For example, P p ≡ ¬H¬p.
In the context of systems that aim to provide anonymity, and particularly in
the context of censorship resistance, temporal logics are a way to express certain
desirable properties. We may wish to prove that a certain fact concerning an agent
is true at a particular moment, such as the possession of a certain amount of credit
or resources. We may wish, however, to prevent this information from remaining
known for longer than the course of the transaction. Temporal logics allow us to
express the concept that a proposition may be true at a certain time, but not at
other times.
There has been little research into using temporal logics to express anonymity,
or even security, properties. This may be due to the complexity of temporal logics,
combined with the ability to abstract away the temporal element of protocols. Few
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existing protocols use explicit timing information, relying instead on single-use
values, nonces, which mark that an event has taken place without reference to the
time domain.
7.2.5 The BAN Logic
BAN (Burrows, Abadi, and Needham, 1989) is a modal logic designed to prove
the correctness of authentication protocols. The logic allows the basic assump-
tions and goals of a protocol to be expressed as formulae in the syntax of the
logic, along with the steps taken during the running of the protocol.
Deduction rules provide a reasoning path from the steps of the protocol to the
desired goals. If this can be successfully achieved then the goals of the protocol
are true.
BAN is based on the beliefs of participants, and some simple rules that allow
the beliefs of an agent to be manipulated. BAN contains many constructs and
deduction rules, including:
• A ⊳ X : A sees X , or the message X has been sent to A.
• A |∼X : A said X at some point.
• A |≡X : A believes, or has justified belief in, X .
• A Z⇒ X : A has jurisdiction over X .
• ♯(X) : The message X is fresh (ie, it has not been seen before).
• {X}K : The message X encrypted with the key K.
As mentioned earlier, many logics abstract away from timing information.
BAN solves the problem of time by distinguishing two epochs, the past and
present, by the use of the fresh construction ♯(X). This has proved sufficient
to reason about a large number of complex protocols.
These constructions are manipulated using deduction rules that define the be-
haviour that results from such facts. For example, the rule of jurisdiction, which
concerns an agent A’s belief based on the perceived authority of another agent B,
can be expressed in the following way:
A |≡B Z⇒ X , A |≡B |≡X
A |≡X
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which may be read as: “If A believes that B has authority over X and A
believes that B believes X , then A believes X .” There are many rules of this form
(Burrows et al., 1989).
BAN has been applied to a number of well-known protocols, most famously in
discovering a timing flaw in the Needham-Schroeder protocol that forms the basis
of the widespread Kerberos authentication mechanism. (That BAN discovered
this is unsurprising, as the logic was developed in response to the discovery of
this flaw by other means.)
There have been a number of logics over the years that have sought to expand
the capabilities of the BAN logic, such as GNY (Gong, Needham, and Yahalom,
1990) and SVO (Syverson and van Oorschot, 1994). These have yet to gain the
level of acceptance enjoyed by BAN, and the increasing use of process calculi
and automated theorem provers has caused approaches such as these to be less
examined than previously.
BAN, as a logic of authentication, may provide an interesting insight into what
is required of anonymity protocols, that can be seen as requiring the opposite of
authentication. We wish to believe that a party with whom we are conversing is
unknown to us, and as such cannot hold any of the properties that the BAN logic
seeks to prove. Despite the fall of such logics from favour in recent years, the
concepts that they embody are useful to us at a high level of abstraction.
7.3 Process Calculi
Process calculi provide a mathematical notation for describing communicating
processes. They take the view of computers as communicating entities in larger
networks, rather than stand-alone machines. This focus on communicating pro-
cesses makes them ideal for the expression of anonymity systems that are by their
very definition concerned with the communication between entities.
7.3.1 CSP
CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) was developed by Hoare as a method
for describing communicating processes operating in parallel:
“... input and output are basic primitives of programming and that parallel
composition of communicating sequential processes is a fundamental pro-
gram structuring method.” Hoare (1978)
CSP was originally described by Hoare (1978), and then updated (Hoare,
1985). Schneider (1999) provides a general introduction.
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CSP has gained a wide following in the formal methods community, and has
undergone many interesting developments, such as timing (Reed and Roscoe,
1986), and probabilistic elements (Morgan et al., 1996). There is mature tool
support for CSP in the form of the model checker FDR (Formal Systems, 2004).
CSP has been applied to the analysis of security protocols, which are intu-
itively applicable to a calculus based on the interaction between communicating
parties Ryan and Schneider (2001). It has been applied to a basic analysis of din-
ing cryptographer networks, in Schneider and Sidiropoulos (1996) (see section
6.2).
CSP processes are defined in a syntax that allows the basic constructs of a stan-
dard programming language, including choice operators and logical expressions.
A brief introduction to the syntax of CSP is given here.
A process definition may be given as a sequence of events. Events may be
combined with a process using the prefixing operator →; so a→ P performs the
event a then behaves like process P , and a → b → P performs the event a then
the event b and then behaves like process P .
Processes can be recursive:
Loop = a→ b→ Loop
= µP.a→ b→ P
The second of these, labelled with µP , allows for a recursive definition with-
out the need to name the process, and may be used in other process expressions
without prior definition.
CSP has sequential execution of processes: P ; Q
The operations that may be performed on processes are:
• Basic Operations
P (n) : Process P parameterized with value n.
?x : E → P (x) : Engage in any event x ∈ P , then behave like P (x).
A2B : Deterministically choose between the initial events
of P and Q, and then behave accordingly.
b&P : (For a boolean b) if b then enable P else stop.
• Parallel Composition
P ||Q : Parallel composition of P and Q requiring full synchronization
of events.
P ||X Q : Parallel composition of P and Q requiring synchronization
on the events of a set X .
P |||Q : Parallel composition of P and Q with no synchronization.
P\Q : Hide events from the set Q from outside observers.
Pa/b : Rename all variables a in P to b.
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• Primitive Processes
Stop : Deadlocked process.
Skip : Successfully terminating process.
CSP is concerned with the sets of observations that can be made of a process.
The simplest useful form of observations is the trace, the sequence of events that
the process engages in. More complex observations include failures, divergences,
and refusals, which contain extra information about the state of the system and
expand ability to reason about a process. By examining these observations it is
possible to prove the adherence of a model to a stated set of goals.
Schneider and Sidiropoulos (1996) use CSP to model and prove anonymity
properties of the dining cryptographer network (section 6.2) consisting of three
participants, assuming a reliable broadcast channel. The model is constructed to
prove the assertion that any data within the system could have originated from
any actor within the system: any permutation of the sequence of events occurring
within a run of the model results in the observations of the system.
Although this proof considers only a toy anonymity system, based on the im-
practical dining cryptographer network, and does not consider an active attacker
with the ability to inject or block messages, the techniques used provide inspira-
tion for further work into proving anonymity properties with process calculi. The
proof is also one of the very few extant examples of a formal methods proof of
anonymity in the literature.
7.3.2 The π-Calculus
The π-calculus is a fundamental reworking of the ideas expressed in Milner (1980)’s
calculus of communicating systems (CCS). CCS and CSP describe communicat-
ing processes in a similar fashion and offer the same level of expressive power.
In seeking to describe communicating processes as they exist in the networked
world that has emerged since the development of CCS and CSP, however, Milner
observes that:
“Physical systems tend to have permanent physical links; they have fixed
structure. But most systems in the informatic world are not physical; their
links may be virtual or symbolic... These symbolic links can be created or
destroyed on the fly...” — Milner (1999):
The π-calculus extends the basic capabilities of CCS to include mobility: agents
can form new links with other agents, and can destroy old links. An agent may
therefore begin life in one area of a system and, in the course of execution, relocate
to an entirely new portion of a system.
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Processes send and receive messages along defined channels. In the π-calculus
these messages may include the name of a channel. This powerful addition allows
the dynamic creation of new topologies in the system. The basic structure of the
calculus is presented here as described by Milner (1999).
There are an infinite setN of names, and a corresponding disjoint setN of co-
names. There is a set of variables disjoint from names and co-names that may be
instantiated to arbitrary values. These structures are collectively known as terms.
Terms
The set of terms is defined (where M , N are terms) by:
n : name (shown as lowercase to distinguish from generic terms)
x : variable
(M,N) : pair
Process Expressions
The set of action prefixes, π, corresponds to the sending or receiving of a name,
along with the silent transition τ . These are represented by:
x(y) Accept y on channel named x
x〈y〉 Send y along channel named x
τ Unobservable action
Processes can be formed as follows:
•
∑
i∈I πi.Pi : summation of processes, corresponding to the execution of an
action (sending or receiving a name, or the internal transition τ ), followed
by some process Pi (where I is a finite indexing set)
• (P1|P2) : composition of P1 with P2, which allows P1 and P2 to run con-
currently
• (νa)P : restriction of the name a to process P , resulting in a being bound
in P
• !P : replication of process P , which allows (infinite) parallel repetition
This set represents the most basic form of the π-calculus. Names may be
passed along channels, processes have the ability to run both sequentially and in
parallel, replication can be expressed, and the scope of names may be restricted to
processes using the ν operator.
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The π-calculus has spawned variants designed for the analysis of differing
interacting systems. Of interest for the treatment of security protocols is that of
Abadi and Gordon (1997) which adds cryptographic primitives to the calculus.
That paper, and further work (Abadi, 1999; Gordon and Jeffries, 2004), provides
a framework, in addition to methods and tools, for the rigorous analysis of security
protocols.
Work in proving security protocols using the π-calculus and its variants often
uses “observational equivalences” between processes. This compares a concrete
model of the protocol, and an abstract specification that expresses the security
properties. Using the calculus, an equivalence is proven between the concrete
model of the protocol and the abstract properties.
There has been work on developing an executable language based on the calcu-
lus. This includes Pict (Pict, 2004), and an extended version with increased mobile
agent communication capabilities called Nomadic Pict (Pict, 2004). The occam-pi
project (Occam-Pi, 2004) combines the CSP basis of the occam programming lan-
guage with the mobility of the π-calculus. The existence of languages in which
π-calculus models can more easily be expressed could potentially increase the
utility of the calculus for obtaining experimental results.
There does not yet appear to have been any work on expressing anonymity
systems within the framework of the π-calculus. The flexibility offered by the
calculus seems to be ideal for representing many of the network topologies that
are being used by the latest anonymity systems, and the existing body of work into
security proofs using the π-calculus provide a source of techniques that could be
of use in proving anonymity properties.
7.3.3 Comparisons
The two approaches described above do not by any means form an exhaustive list
of existing process calculi. There are many other process calculi in existence, such
as elements of the ISO standard LOTOS (ISO, 1987) for formal description of
systems, Bergstra’s Algebra of Communicating Processes with Abstraction (ACP)
(Bergstra and Klop, 1985) and many variants based on the π-calculus (Parrow and
Victor, 1998; Abadi and Gordon, 1997; Herescu and Palamidessi, 2000). The
multitude of π-calculus variants and CSP are, however, the most widely used and
studied process calculi, certainly in formal methods security research.
The fundamental difference between the π-calculus and CSP is in the approach
taken toward semantics. CSP uses denotational semantics to treat the set of obser-
vations that can be made of processes. The π-calculus, and its predecessor CCS,
use algebraic semantics to prove equivalences in systems.
CSP has been a well-established language for many years, and is supported by
a wide variety of mature tools to aid in proofs (Formal Systems, 2004). There is
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a large body of work both in using and extending the language, including work
on security proofs (Lowe, 1996; Ryan and Schneider, 2001) and the previously
mentioned work on anonymity (Schneider and Sidiropoulos, 1996).
Additionally, there has been work into transforming the abstract language of
CSP into executable forms. The parallel programming language occam, origi-
nally designed for the INMOS transputer, is strongly based on the version of CSP
presented in Hoare (1978), and there has been work into transforming CSP spec-
ifications into other executable languages (Stepney, 2003; Gardner, 2003). The
ability to create models that can feasibly be executed greatly increases the poten-
tial for real-world experimentation in addition to abstract proofs.
The π-calculus, however, has itself received some attempts towards an exe-
cutable form. As is mentioned above, both Pict (Pict, 2004) and Nomadic Pict
(Pict, 2004) are strongly based on the π-calculus, although these projects are less
developed than their CSP counterparts.
The main strength of the π-calculus over CSP lies in its explicit ability to
model mobility. In the π-calculus, channel names may be passed as data in order
to create new links between agents in the system. In attempts to model the in-
teractions between anonymous participants, and also to express the relationships
between different aspects of user identities, the ability to model the creation and
destruction of links in the system could be of great use.
Both CSP and the π-calculus have been extended in many ways. Of im-
portance to modelling anonymity systems will be factors such as the inclusion
of cryptographic operations (Abadi and Gordon, 1997), the potential for asyn-
chronous communications (Herescu and Palamidessi, 2000), and the addition of
probabilistic capabilities (Herescu and Palamidessi, 2000; Lowe, 1995). Any of
these may be found in either calculus, however the explicit expression of mobility
possible in the π-calculus may turn out to be an important advantage over CSP,
despite the latter’s extensive tool support.
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